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Abstract
Various security, regulatory, and consequence management agencies are interested in continuously monitoring wide areas for
unexpected changes in radioactivity. Existing detection systems are designed to search for radioactive sources but are not suited
to repeat mapping and change detection. Using a set of daily spectral observations collected at the Pickle Research Campus, we
improved on the prior Spectral Comparison Ratio Anomaly Mapping (scram) algorithm and developed a new method based on
two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests to detect sudden spectral changes. We also designed simulations and visualizations of
statistical power to compare methods and guide deployment scenarios.
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1. Introduction
The threat of dirty bombs and lost or stolen radioactive
sources has prompted the development of a variety of systems
to detect and identify radioactive materials, ranging from van-
mounted gamma imaging systems to backpack-based search
systems. These systems are typically designed for border check-
points, source search, or source identification, but not for the
continuous monitoring of a wide area. Here we investigate de-
tecting changes in radiation spectra over a wide area, such as
a city, stadium, campus, or large public event. Our goal is to
develop an automated mobile sensor system which could moni-
tor radiation spectra over time and detect sudden changes that
might indicate the introduction of a radioactive source.
The fastest and most sensitive existing method for mapping
radiation over a wide area is a low-altitude helicopter survey; the
Department of Homeland Security has funded several helicopter
surveys of large cities, producing maps used as a baseline for
emergency response plans [1, 2]. However, the high cost of
operating helicopters makes it impractical to use them to monitor
a city over a long period of time.
Previous ground-based efforts have focused on source search:
traveling through a city and locating a lost or stolen source
when no prior radiological survey is available. Because the
natural background radiation varies from place to place due to
geology and construction materials, these systems must separate
natural variation from variation due to a target radioactive source,
usually by assuming that natural variation is much smaller than
that caused by the target source, or by examining only the energy
ranges typical of target sources [3]. This limits their sensitivity—
a small target source may hide among the variation in the natural
background, or may emit at energies not chosen for targeting.
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A long-term radiation surveillance system could avoid this
problem by comparing newly recorded spectra with previous
observations at the same location. For example, we previously
developed the scram algorithm, which is meant to be used with
mobile detectors that repeatedly patrol the same area, recording
spectra with timestamps and GPS locations [4]. The map is
divided into grid cells and each cell’s spectrum is compared to
previous observations in the same cell. scram does not discrimi-
nate between source types, instead using its knowledge of the
background spectrum to know what spectra are expected.
However, scram has shortcomings: it downsamples energy
spectra into only eight bins, which potentially limits sensitivity to
small or distant sources, and it requires several repeat mappings
of the same area to estimate accurately the covariance structure
between energy bins.
We propose a new method based on Kolmogorov–Smirnov
tests which, like scram, can detect any spectral changes re-
gardless of type, but requires no covariance estimates and no
downsampling, and hence can work with less background data.
This method is simpler, has higher power and provides better
source localization than scram. To guide detector deployment,
we present simulations and visualizations of statistical power
which allow operators to find areas of vulnerability.
2. Data
We collected our data using a 2 × 2 inch Bridgeport Instru-
ments cesium iodide spectrometer, a laptop, and a GPS unit. The
spectrometer continuously recorded gamma rays and produced a
4,096-bin spectral histogram every two seconds; the laptop then
recorded the histogram, time, and location. In typical conditions,
80–120 gamma rays were observed per histogram. An example
spectrum, consisting of typical background gamma rays and
summed over several hours, is shown in Fig. 2, while Fig. 3
shows a sample taken near a radioactive cesium-137 source.
Preprint submitted to Nuclear Instruments and Methods September 3, 2015
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Figure 1: A map of Pickle Research Campus with total gamma counts per
second overlaid; counts are averaged over one month of data collection. Areas
of elevated background include the radioactive materials storage facility at the
northwest corner (A) and a cluster of large brick buildings near central campus
(B). Figure reprinted from [4].
The dataset consists of once- or twice-daily drives through
Pickle Research Campus (PRC) in the months of July and Au-
gust 2012. The spectrometer and GPS unit were loaded onto
a golf cart and driven around campus for roughly half an hour.
Various spectral features at PRC, such as slightly-radioactive
brick buildings and a radiological waste storage site, cause the
area to have total background radiation levels which vary in
space by about a factor of three; this variation is shown in Fig. 1.
Cumulatively, the data includes roughly 18 hours of observations
taken over 41 drives through campus on 30 different days.
In the course of our analysis we discovered that the dataset
is contaminated: we used our Kolmogorov–Smirnov anomaly
detection algorithm (Section 3.3) to compare each day to the
previous day and identified days with unusual spectral differ-
ences, the largest of which is likely due to a downpour of 7 cm
of rain the previous evening; rain can cause large variation in
background spectra [5, 6]. In the rest of our analysis we ex-
cluded this day. (This was the largest rain event during the dry
Texas summer, and the only to cause a noticeable anomaly.) This
ensures our estimates of false positive rates (Section 3.3) do not
contain true positives; we’ll instead use simulated sources of
known size and location to test our algorithms. Future work
may be able to account for rain-induced spectral changes using
a model to relate precipitation rate and radon progeny deposited
by rain [7].
3. Approach
To detect radioactive sources, two things are required. The
first is a way to account for the natural spatial variation in back-
ground spectra (Section 3.1). The second is an anomaly detec-
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Example background spectrum
Figure 2: A typical background radiation spectrum at Pickle Research Cam-
pus, comprising 32,173 gamma rays observed over several hours. Energy in
kiloelectronvolts, in 4,096 bins, is shown on a logarithmic scale.
tion algorithm which compares the background model with new
observations and tests for statistically significant differences,
producing a map of anomalous regions (Sections 3.2 and 3.3).
Global false discovery control is essential to make the system
practical, and the power of the procedure needs to be established
for target radioactive sources.
The anomaly detection algorithm should use only the shape
of the spectrum, not the total count rate, since observed count
rates will vary widely depending on the detector, and a wide area
monitoring system may use different sizes of detectors mounted
on different vehicles at different heights. Also, like scram, our
anomaly detection algorithm does not attempt to discriminate
between benign and threatening anomalies, instead searching
for any spectral change; users who need to search for specific
sources can check anomalies using a source identification algo-
rithm to locate specific isotopes [8, 9].
3.1. Background Radiation Model
The background spectrum arises from natural deposits of
uranium, thorium, radon, and their decay products; these ele-
ments are more common in certain kinds of rock, such as granite,
and hence the spectrum varies with local geology. This variation
is usually smooth, though sudden changes in geology (such as a
man-made granite wall) can cause sharp background changes.
Similarly, different concrete mixes can have different mixtures
of naturally radioactive materials, causing variation in the back-
ground emitted by concrete structures [10]. To avoid comparing
new data to a heterogenous background, we divide the map into
spatial cells and aggregate each cell’s data over several days to
provide a background estimate.
3.2. Spectral Comparison Ratio Anomaly Mapping (scram)
The scram procedure was our initial attempt to perform
anomaly detection [4]. It is based on the method of spectral
comparison ratios of [3] and proceeds as follows: new spectra to
be tested are aggregated in 250 × 250 meter spatial cells (there
are typically 12–15 such cells per day for the data analyzed
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Figure 3: Spectrum recorded near a sample of radioactive cesium-137. The sharp
peak on the right side of the plot, which stands out from the normal background,
is the characteristic 662 keV gamma ray emitted in the decay of cesium-137.
here), downsampled from 4,096 energy bins to 8, and a χ2-like
anomaly statistic D2 calculated in each cell by comparing the
8-bin spectrum to spectra recorded on previous days in the same
cell. Large values of D2 relative to a reference distribution
indicate elevated radioactive emissions in the corresponding
cells.
scram makes various simplifying assumptions: count rates
have a constant variance-to-mean ratio and background spectra
are treated as exact. These assumptions imply that the χ2 dis-
tribution assumption underlying the test statistic D2 does not
hold; in particular, the distribution has a heavier tail than a χ2
[4]. We instead estimated the reference distribution of D2 with
a histogram of values of D2 calculated for each of the 30 days
of recorded data. This resulted in 399 observed test statistics,
12–15 per day, assumed to be from the null hypothesis that no
genuine spectral difference exists. The 99th percentile of these
values was D2 = 83, which was then used as the cutoff for an
α = 0.01 level test.
We consider a slightly modified version in this paper. Indeed,
this cutoff value is not only variable, since it is estimated from a
small sample, but it is also biased, since the dataset contains true
positives, as mentioned earlier—rain-induced spectral changes
produced anomalies across the entire map for one day. These
outlying points inflated the D2 cutoff. We excluded this day of
observations from the dataset rather than attempting to isolate
specific affected cells. We then repeated the procedure and
calculated a parametric rather than a nonparametric cutoff: we
fit a gamma distribution with probability density function
f (x) =
βα
Γ(α)
xα−1e−βx.
to the resulting 387 test statistics by maximum likelihood, and
used its 99th percentile, D2 = 39.7, as the cutoff. The gamma
distribution includes the χ2 distribution as a special case but is
more flexible, allowing in particular for the heavier tails caused
by the assumption violations [4]. This parametric cutoff may
be biased if the gamma reference distribution is not perfectly
adequate, but it is also less sensitive to outliers and has lower
estimation variance than the empirical cutoff of [4]. This lower
rejection threshold has substantial impact on our power com-
parisons (see Section 4.1); the revised scram method is more
sensitive than originally proposed.
Note that the nonparametric cutoff of [4] and the parametric
cutoff calculated here are estimated from data, so they are vari-
able. There is no standard analytical formula for the confidence
interval of this estimate, so we used bootstrapping to estimate
the uncertainty in this fit, using the following procedure [11]:
1. Re-sample at random and with replacement from the 387
test statistics.
2. Fit the gamma distribution to this new sample and calcu-
late its 99th percentile.
3. Repeat 10,000 times.
The quantiles of the 10,000 repeat values of the cutoff are used
to set the 95% basic bootstrap confidence interval of [33.5, 45.2],
suggesting more data would be needed to more accurately choose
a rejection threshold.
3.3. Kolmogorov–Smirnov Anomaly Detection
We developed an alternative approach that does not require
empirical estimation of its rejection region, does not reduce
its detection power by downsampling spectra, and does not
require repeat days of observation to estimate the correlation
between energy bins. Our approach uses a standard two-sample
Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test.
We again divide space into square cells and compare each
cell to prior data. This approach treats gamma rays as draws
from an underlying energy distribution, with the KS test check-
ing if two samples come from the same distribution. Specifically,
if c j1, c j2, . . . , c jn j is a list of energies of n j gamma rays from
distribution j, we let Fˆ j(x) be their empirical cumulative distri-
bution function—the proportion with energy less than or equal
to x:
Fˆ j(x) =
1
n j
n j∑
i=1
1(c ji ≤ x),
where 1(·) is the indicator function, which is 1 when its argument
is true and 0 otherwise. In our case, Fˆ1(x) is the observed
distribution of background gamma ray energies, and Fˆ2(x) the
distribution of a new observation. Then the test statistic is
D = sup
x
∣∣∣Fˆ1(x) − Fˆ2(x)∣∣∣ .
When both samples are drawn from the same continuous distri-
bution, D has a null distribution which is easily approximated by
standard statistical software packages. When they are not from
the same distribution, D tends to be large and the test rejects the
null hypothesis, though as with all tests, its sensitivity decreases
when the sample sizes n1 and n2 decrease.
The standard approximations for the KS test statistic null
distribution assume that the data is drawn from a continuous
probability distribution, so that no two observations have exactly
the same value. However, our detector creates ties by discretiz-
ing energies into bins, biasing the test’s p values to be larger than
expected. We checked this by repeatedly simulating (resampling
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with replacement) from a single reference spectrum, then testing
the simulated spectra against the reference spectrum; despite the
spectra being draws from the same distribution, their p values
were not uniformly distributed but were skewed towards one. Bi-
ased p-values are problematic because they imply that the false
positive rate of the test does not match the chosen significance
level.
This problem could be solved by using a nonparametric
permutation test, which simulates the null distribution of D by
repeatedly permuting the labels on the data. The gamma energies
are gathered into a single list c11, c12, . . . , c1n1 , c21, c22, . . . , c2n2
and the following procedure is run:
1. Randomly shuffle the data list. Treat the first n1 entries as
samples from distribution 1 and the remaining n2 entries
as samples from distribution 2.
2. Calculate D with the new samples.
3. Repeat at least 1,000 times. Calculate the p value as the
fraction of D values larger than the unshuffled D.
The shuffling ensures there is no systematic difference between
the two samples, so we can simulate the distribution of D under
the null hypothesis without any parametric assumptions. This
eliminates the bias but requires time-consuming simulations.
Alternatively, [12] describes a procedure for calculating an exact
p value in the case of ties, but for large sample sizes, the calcu-
lation is even slower than the permutation test. We next tested
whether we could avoid these costly adjustments by calibrating
the p value threshold to get an approximate α = 0.05 test, and
whether this test would have power equivalent to the permutation
test.
We again used a simulation procedure, repeatedly resam-
pling from a background distribution and injecting gamma rays
from a cesium-137 source. First, we ran the simulation 10,000
times without the injected source, producing a null distribution,
and calculated that 5% of the KS test’s p values were below
p = 0.067, so we adopted this as our rejection threshold. Then
we ran 1,000 simulations for each of several injected source
sizes and compared the power of this adjusted KS test to the
unadjusted permutation test. They were virtually identical, im-
plying that the KS test with adjusted rejection threshold will
suffice.
Finally, we checked how the bias manifested in real data.
For every day of data, we compared the observations in each
spatial cell to the previous day’s background measurements,
then calculated the fraction of p values below the unadjusted
α = 0.05 threshold. We repeated this procedure for several cell
sizes between 20×20 and 100×100 meters. Results are shown in
Table 1. We found that for 20 × 20m spatial cells, the proportion
of test statistics below α = 0.05 was 0.052, close to 0.05. For
large 100 × 100m cells the p values are biased downwards, with
nearly 12% of p values smaller than the α = 0.05 threshold.
This is the opposite of the bias we would expect from ties,
and must come from some other source. To confirm this, we
repeated the same simulation procedure but produced p values
using the permutation test. This test does not suffer from bias
caused by ties, but Table 1 shows that its p values become
even more biased towards zero than the KS test’s as the cell
Cell size (m) Sample n KS α Permutation α
20 4604 0.052 0.064
40 2412 0.070 0.082
100 949 0.116 0.133
Table 1: For each size of spatial cell, the number of KS tests performed and
the proportion of test statistics smaller than the nominal α = 0.05 level. The
permutation test appears to have a higher false positive rate than the standard
test using the asymptotic null distribution.
size increases. This bias occurs because large spatial cells are
spectrally heterogenous, so there are genuine differences to be
detected. The permutation and unadjusted tests both pick this
up and report more p < 0.05 results, but for the latter this shift
is partly balanced out by the opposite skew caused by ties. This
suggests that the unadjusted KS test would be more useful in
practice.
For the remainder of this paper we will therefore use the
KS test, as it is much faster to compute, gives results which
have good detection power, and has approximately the correct
false positive rate when used with 20 × 20m spatial cells. Larger
cells would have larger sample sizes and greater power, but
would have more false positives and be less able to localize
small sources, so there is a tradeoff. When applied to other
datasets with different detector sensitivity and spatial variability,
the optimal cell size may differ.
3.4. False Discovery Rate Detection
To produce an anomaly map, the data are divided into a
spatial grid, with each cell’s background observation compared
to the new data collected within the same cell, producing a
p value for each cell. To prevent many false detections due
to multiple comparisons, the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure
[13] is used to select a p value cutoff to achieve a chosen false
discovery rate, defined as the expected proportion of detections
that are false out of all the detections. In this procedure, the cell
p values are sorted into ascending order, p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pm,
and the significance threshold is set to be the largest pi such
that pi ≤ iq/m, where q is the desired false discovery rate. This
guarantees that, on average, the fraction of significant results
which are statistical false positives will be q. We set q = 0.2 for
our simulations, but q can be chosen to meet operational needs.
4. Results
We built on previous simulation tools [14] to create a set of
power simulations to evaluate the performance of our anomaly
detection algorithm. These simulations inject radioactive sources
into observed data and account for the distance between source
and detector, both with the normal 1/r2 falloff and with ex-
ponential attenuation due to gamma absorption in air, but not
for physical obstacles, down-scatter, or shielding between the
source and the detector. In this sense they are idealized; heav-
ily shielded sources are harder to detect than the simulations
suggest, and down-scatter will alter their spectra.
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The count rate λ for injected sources was based on the as-
sumption that
λ ∝ s
r2
exp(−µd),
where r is the distance to the source in meters, s is its size in
milliCuries and µ = 0.0100029 m−1 is the attenuation coefficient
for cesium-137’s 660 keV gamma rays. The proportionality
constant was determined from an experiment which placed a
0.000844 mCi cesium-137 source 0.05 meters away from our
detector, recording 630 counts per second, so that ultimately, our
source simulation model was:
λ(d, s) =
s
0.000844
· 630 ·
(
0.05
r
)2
· exp (−µ(r + 0.05)) .
To test our anomaly detection algorithm we must specify
the anomalies of interest. The example in Fig. 3 shows the
spectrum recorded near a sample of radioactive cesium-137; a
sharp high-energy peak is apparent. Other anomalies may be
different; iridium-192, for example, appears as several smaller
peaks between 200 and 600 keV mixed in among the large
background radiation smear. Statistical power depends on the
type of radioactive source present, but because the KS test uses
the cumulative distribution of gamma rays, it is sensitive to sharp
peaks as well as spread-out differences in the spectrum. We will
use cesium-137 for all our power simulations for consistency.
We also need to specify the background observation period
based on the expected rate of change of the background spectrum.
If the background is known to vary naturally over a period of a
few days or weeks, we may use only the most recent few days
to form the background to avoid using an outdated background
estimate.
Despite this precaution, the selected background and ob-
servation periods may have genuine spectral differences, for
example if rain changes the background spectrum. If these are
statistically significant, then every simulation will result in a
statistically significant result. To prevent this, we do not use
data from the new observation period; instead, we sample with
replacement the matching number of gamma rays from the back-
ground period in every spatial cell and inject the radioactive
source into that simulated data. In practice, maps with anoma-
lies reported everywhere would indicate a global phenomena,
such as environmental change or calibration issue, and would be
investigated accordingly.
4.1. Minimum Detectable Sources vs. Distance
To compare the sensitivity of scram and KS tests for detect-
ing small spectral anomalies, the first simulation determines the
minimum radioactive source size necessary to trigger an alarm
(p < 0.01) with 80% power, at varying source distances from the
detector. A 20-meter section of road at the PRC was selected as
the test site and simulated cesium-137 sources injected at various
distances from the road. KS tests and scram were run on the
entire aggregated segment of road, using the previous seven days
of observations as background data. (The detection threshold
for scram was set by applying the procedure from Section 3.2 to
20-meter cells.) Fig. 4 shows the results; it provides the mini-
mum detectable source at a given distance, and conversely the
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Figure 4: Minimum source sizes detectable by our 2 × 2 inch detector with
80% power as a function of distance, compared between KS tests and scram.
The horizontal line indicates a 100 milliCurie source. KS tests are a clear
improvement over scram, and the revised scram detection thresholds are a major
improvement over the old version.
maximum distance at which a given source can be detected. For
example, the horizontal line indicates the maximum distances at
which a 100 milliCurie source can be detected by each algorithm
at least 80% of the time. The old scram procedure detects it
at about 65m, while the KS test detects it as far away as 90m,
a substantial improvement in detection power. scram with the
revised detection threshold is also an improvement, performing
nearly as well as the KS tests.
To illustrate the small amount of data that can be used to
detect a source, Fig. 5 shows a background spectrum (about five
seconds of observations), a simulated contaminated spectrum
containing cesium-137 (about one second of observations), and
a simulated spectrum with no contamination. Despite the small
sample sizes, the KS test correctly identifies a statistically sig-
nificant difference in the anomalous spectrum. (Recall that it
detects differences in shape, not total number of counts.)
Because the KS test is simpler and more powerful than scram,
the remainder of our power simulations will focus on the KS
test. We do not show the equivalent power maps for scram.
4.2. Minimum Detectable Source Maps
We also designed a minimum detectable source simulation
tool. The user chooses a radioactive source, a minimum de-
sired statistical power, a background observation period, and a
new observation day. The simulation grids the data in the new
observation day and sequentially injects a source at each grid
location, recording the minimum source size required to have
the desired power of detection in at least one grid cell. (Again,
power is calculated by testing if the cell would be considered
significant after false discovery rate control.) This produces a
map of source sizes: the smallest detectable source size at each
location.
An example map is shown in Fig. 6, which shows that with a
week of daily background observations and only five minutes of
new data, we have high power to detect fairly small radioactive
sources along the detector’s route. More distant sources must be
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Figure 5: At top, a simulated background spectrum comprising only 504 gamma
rays drawn from the sample shown in Fig. 2. Center, a simulated spectrum
comprising 97 background gamma rays and 50 from the cesium-137 sample
shown in Fig. 3. Bottom, a simulated background of 116 gamma rays. Despite
the small sample, the KS test correctly identifies the anomalous spectrum.
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Figure 6: At each location, the smallest cesium-137 source that can be detected
with 80% power by a detector which drove through once, using one full week of
background data. The drive amounted to just five minutes of observations along
the white dashed route.
much larger to be reliably detected. An operator could use this
map to understand the performance of the system and evaluate its
ability to detect potential threats. This tool could also be adapted
to plan detector routes through an area, identifying routes which
efficiently cover the area of interest.
4.3. Power Maps for Detecting Chosen Sources
The next simulation we designed was interactive. The user
selects a background observation period and a set of new data.
The user then chooses a radioactive source and size and can
click on a map to inject the source at any desired location in the
new data. An anomaly is considered statistically significant if it
passes the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure with a false discovery
rate of 0.2, and the power measures how likely this is to occur
in repeated simulations. One such simulation, using a 500 mCi
cesium-137 source, is shown in Fig. 7. The source, placed in an
empty field, is easily detected on the nearby road.
Because the map is interactive—parallelization means the
simulations can run in just a few seconds—the user can explore
likely locations for radioactive sources and determine if the
available data is adequate to detect sources at these locations. If
not, detectors could be rerouted to fill the gaps.
A non-interactive version of this map is easy to produce. Af-
ter choosing a radioactive source and size, the source is injected
into each grid cell, which is assigned a color proportional to
the probability of detecting the source. (A source is considered
to be detected if it results in a statistically significant anomaly
anywhere else on the map, after the Benjamini–Hochberg proce-
dure is applied.) If there is a specific target source of concern,
this map shows where it would be best detected. We did not
include an example here because the map looks like the inverse
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Figure 7: Power to detect a 500 mCi cesium-137 source, injected at the blue
dot, using one full week of background data (130 minutes of observations) and a
single pass (22 minutes) of observations of the campus. The map shows only
the northwest corner of PRC; each grid cell is 20 × 20 meters, for a total of 245
cells, so the average cell contains just five seconds of observations of the source.
of Fig. 6—cells where the minimum detectable source is small
have a higher power to detect the user-specified source.
5. Conclusions
KS tests promise to be a powerful, flexible, and simple alter-
native to scram for wide-area mapping and anomaly detection.
More importantly, we have developed simulation tools that can
guide the deployment of our anomaly detection algorithm in
practice, showing that it can be made useful for real-world appli-
cations.
Comparisons against existing mobile source search systems,
such as spectral comparison ratios [3] and the NaI–SS Radiation
Search System [15], are difficult. These systems are not designed
to monitor a wide area continuously for a long period of time,
and their ability to detect small and distance sources has been
evaluated using different sources and detectors than we possess.
Nonetheless, we believe that our KS procedure is better suited to
long-term radiation surveillance, particularly with the simulation
tools we have developed to aid deployment.
Future work may expand our simulations and tests based
on standard procedures such as those defined in ANSI N42.43–
2006 or the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s Technical Ca-
pability Standard for Vehicle Mounted Mobile Systems. This
would include simulating other common industrial and medical
radioisotopes, as well as simulating shielded sources.
There are also opportunities for future improvement of our
anomaly detection system. We could incorporate methods to de-
tect specific isotopes or ignore known benign source types, such
as common medical radioisotopes, building on previous work
in isotope detection and identification [8, 9]. Additionally, we
have not built a spatial model of spectra which allows borrowing
of information between spatial cells. Two options are to smooth
spectra in space [16] or to use a spatial false discovery procedure
[17, 18]; it is not clear which will bring the greatest benefits, but
either method would further improve sensitivity. We can also
incorporate automated energy calibration [19] and rain detection
[7] to better estimate background spectra with less variance.
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